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In this paper I present and make a critical analysis of the thoughts of the Sierra 
Leonean philosopher George M. Carew,1 who is the author of one of the broadest 
contemporary visions of the political future of Africa. Carew is disappointed with the 
decades of authoritarian rule in African countries, which have brought about neither 
development nor prosperity. He believes that the only political system able to change this 
situation is democracy.2 
In the opinion of this thinker, the prerequisite for building and consolidating 
democracy in the African state is democratisation of the mechanisms governing the current 
global political and economic order. The hierarchisation and unfair, in Carew’s opinion, 
principles governing the provision of assistance to poor countries are a substantial hindrance 
to the development of democracy there. Carew also enumerates several arguments 
supporting this thesis. 
The philosopher subjects various elements of the world order to a tough evaluation 
and is particularly critical of the mechanisms governing the decision-making processes. As a 
result, he is a proponent of far-reaching democratisation of international economic and 
political relations. 
The significance of Carew’s views consists mainly in the fact that he points out the 
importance of the concept of deliberative democracy for the African countries looking after 
their interests, as now they do not have any effective instruments of acting in the global 
                                                                 
1 George Munda Carew – one of the leading contemporary political thinkers of West Africa; a Protestant 
missionary and lecturer in Liberia; PhD in philosophy at the University of Connecticut; professor of phi l os ophy 
in: Fourah Bay College in Freetown in Sierra Leone, University of Connecticut, University of Iowa, Spelman 
College in Atlanta, and the United Methodist University in Monrovia in Liberia; former ambassador of Sierra 
Leone in the United States; author of many papers on political thought, published largely in the West. 
2 For more see: K. Trzciński, ‘Budowanie demokracji  w Afryce. Wizja George’a Carewa ’ (‘Building Democracy in 
Africa. The Vision of George Carew’), Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, vol. 1, no. 7, 2010; J. Zdanowski 
(ed.), ‘Idee i  ideologie w krajach Azji  i  Afryki ’ (‘Ideas and Ideologies in Asian and African states’), Krakowskie 
Studia Międzynarodowe, vol. 1, no. 7, 2010, pp. 249–272. 
environment.3 In Carew’s opinion, democratisation of the world order should consist in the 
order being reformed in accordance with three principles which he considers the 
fundamental ideals of deliberative democracy: rational deliberation, participatory politics 
and civic governance. 
The international civil society should help execute this objective, its organisations 
should be the first to be governed in accordance with the principles of deliberative 
democracy and then serve as a model to other entities in the international arena. Carew 
believes that a success in introducing deliberative democracy in the international order 
should also contribute to the implementation of its ideals within the African state. 
 
Influence of external factors on the development of democracy in Africa 
In Carew’s opinion, internal political, economic and socio-cultural transformations in 
the African state, however deep, are alone insufficient for democracy to develop and prevail. 
He states that ‘just as the environment within the state must be conducive to democracy so 
must the climate outside the state be democratic in order for the African state to be capable 
of democratic action’.4 At the same time, Carew points out that the contemporary global 
economic and political system has a deeply non-democratic character. 
Furthermore, the philosopher believes that the present world order, in which policy 
is conducted through financial organisations operating globally, is weakening the processes 
of democratisation in Africa. This is the case primarily because of the fact that burdensome 
economic reforms are forced, especially by the states and organisations of the rich West, 
upon the poor African countries. In Africa, this practice often leads to the emergence of a rift 
between the liberal, free-market economic transformation and democratic transformations . 
Carew expresses the view that the economic globalism, which he defines as the 
global dimension of the functioning of a strongly liberalised free-market economic system, 
has a detrimental effect on the democratisation of poor countries. In the opinion of the 
Sierra Leonean philosopher, it is symptomatic of economic globalism that economic 
inequalities exist and constantly grow in the world and that the hierarchy basically 
composed of two main groups – rich states and poor states – is ever more consolidated.5 In 
this hierarchy, the poor African countries have been assigned a marginal position of 
dependence, from which they cannot break free. In Carew’s opinion, in the world today the 
rich states and their societies are very clearly more privileged at the expense of those which 
                                                                 
3 Also called ‘discursive’ democracy. See e.g.: D. Miller, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice’, Political 
Studies, vol. 40, Supplement 1, 1992, pp 54–67; A. Gutman, ‘Democracy’, in R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit (eds), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford: Blackwell , 1993; J. Węgrzecki, ‘Przyszłość demokracji  
deliberatywnej’ (‘The Future of Deliberative Democracy’), Athenaeum, vol. 22, 2009, pp. 27–42. 
4 G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach , Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2006, p. 132. 
5 Ibidem, p. 129. 
are poor. This is proven by, for instance, the fact that the poor states are a testing ground for 
economic experiments conducted by specialists from countries whose societies would never 
allow such experiments to be conducted on them. 
As Carew notes, especially in African countries, rigorous liberal reforms were 
introduced for many years with the aim of ‘healing’ their economies. They were devised and 
largely also implemented by the proponents of the strongly liberalised, free-market 
economic system. In most cases, the implementation ended in a fiasco.6 What Carew refers 
to are particularly the so called Structural Adjustment Programmes,7 developed principally 
by experts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and implemented 
with assistance from them. The introduction of these programmes in African countries 
involved deregulation of prices of imported goods, reduction or elimination of various 
government subsidies, elimination of barriers to trade, curbing inflation through devaluation 
of local currencies, facilitation of capital export to foreign countries, etc.  The consequence of 
these at least partially sound – it seems – policies was bankruptcy of many enterprises, 
increased prices of most goods, the outflow of capital from Africa, and mass layoffs, in both 
the state and private sectors. Carew is appalled at this situation and asks: ‘How was it to be 
explained to a household of several sub-family units that the few breadwinners in the 
household should be laid off as part of an IMF-inspired downsizing of government 
bureaucracy?’.8 
As the Sierra Leonean philosopher notes, economic transformations have weakened 
the African state, for its institutions were not able to help those who were harmed by their 
effects. In Carew’s opinion, in the past, adjustment programmes considerably contributed to  
the destabilisation of the political situation in various African countries, including military 
coups d’état. Of course, this took place in complete contradiction to the intention behind 
democratisation. Consequently, as Carew claims, economic globalism has not modernised 
the African countries, but has made them even more backward.9 Today, these countries are 
experiencing severe economic problems which, in the philosopher’s opinion, are correlated 
with the realities of global economy and politics. Under economic globalism, poor countries 
are even undergoing a process of recolonisation, as Carew points out, adding that they are 
‘former colonies, which received their independence only to be recolonised’.10 
                                                                 
6 Cf.: K. Trzciński, ‘Depolityzacja społeczeństwa i organizacja władzy autoryta rnej oraz ich wpływ na brak 
rozwoju w państwach Afryki ’ (‘Depolitisation of the Society and Organisation of Authoritarian Power, as well a s  
their Influence on the Lack of Development in African Countries ’), in T. Koziełło, P. Maj, W. Paruch (eds), 
Adaptacja–reforma–stabilizacja. Przestrzeń publiczna we współczesnych systemach politycznych  (Adaptation–
Reform–Stabilisation. Public Space in Contemporary Political Systems), Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Rzeszowskiego, 2010, p. 267. 
7 Presently replaced by Poverty Reductions Strategy Papers  (PRSPs). 
8 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the State in Africa’, in K. Wiredu (ed.), A 
Companion to African Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 465. 
9 Carew uses the term ‘obsolete’. 
10 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the State in Africa ’, p. 469. 
The philosopher is convinced that the economic and political transformations 
conducted simultaneously in African states proved to be mutually exclusive rather than 
complementary because the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund considered 
the implementation of the free market principles the prerequisite for democratic reforms. 
However, with the rigorous conditions of economic reforms imposed by these institutions, 
the hope for democratisation proved illusory. 
In Carew’s opinion, it is external factors that are largely responsible for the 
governance crisis and unsuccessful development of democracy in Africa. The philosopher is 
convinced that the sources of economic and political underdevelopment are to be found 
already in the policy of, as he calls them, the framers of constitutional decolonisation. He 
writes that: ‘From their perspective, the postcolonial state had taken its place among the 
family of equal sovereign states and should discharge its obligations as a sovereign nation by 
simply adhering to the rules. That is to say, like the other states in the global economy, the 
postcolonial state was expected to promote a market economy’.11 
However, the essence of the problem is that, as the Sierra Leonean philosopher 
repeats after Crawford Young12, the poor African states have always been forced to accept a 
subordinated status in the international hierarchy.13 Struggling with various challenges, the 
weak states were to conduct their internal policies according to rules which they were not 
allowed to set by themselves and which did not necessarily correspond to the conditions in 
these countries, including the state of extreme poverty and multiethnicity.14 
 
Polemics with Carew’s theses – Part 1 
The views presented by Carew should not be accepted uncritically. First, however, we 
should sum up the principal claims of the philosopher concerning the external barriers to 
democratisation of the African state. Carew assumes that in the world order based on 
hierarchy, international financial institutions  such as the World Bank and the IMF – 
established and controlled by the rich countries – impose programmes of economic 
transformations devised by their own experts on the poor countries, while the governments 
                                                                 
11 Ibidem, p. 464. 
12 M. Crawford Young – an eminent North American specialist in African studies, retired professor of political 
science at the University of Wisconsin, dealing e.g. with the problems of African statehood, particularly on the 
example of Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo); the author of Politics in Congo: Decolonization and 
Independence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965; Ideology and Development in Africa, Yale University 
Press, 1982; The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994; co-
author of (with Thomas Turner) The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985. 
13 For more see: C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, pp. 282–292. 
14 For more see: G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach , op. cit., p. 
127. 
of these countries have no significant influence on these programmes.15 Consequently, the 
processes of decision-making concerning the life of the people inhabiting the African s tate 
actually take place outside this state and with no meaningful participation of the state’s 
internal institutions.16 Thus, the state authorities loose a considerable share of control over 
the economy, while external entities in fact govern the work of key state institutions and 
influence the actions of its politicians so that they remain in accordance with the principles 
of the implemented projects. For instance, experts from international financial institutions 
forbid the governments of poor countries to subsidise certain sectors of their economies and 
order them to limit public spending. At least initially, these actions can lead to an increase in 
the number of unemployed people and cause a collapse of the healthcare, education or 
social security systems. 
No one can deny the fact that the introduction of very rigorous policies which are to 
bring about quick and dramatic changes in developing states often results in further 
impoverishment of a significant share of the societies of these countries.17 This can lead to 
the development of social anarchy in the state. In such cases, the authorities often resort to 
the use of force. In a weak state, actions of this type can often take a non-democratic turn. 
However, even if they do not cross the boundaries of law, the very harshness of the 
transformation can make the society give power in the next elections to groups which 
promise that they will renounce the implementation of these painful reforms . This scenario 
is not only probable, but actually often takes place. 
What is more, some academic researchers and activists from non-governmental 
organisations accuse the experts representing international financial institutions of 
repeating certain commonly accepted patterns in implementing economic reforms in poor 
countries without taking into account the specific factors, conditions and determinants  of 
these countries, such as their culture.18 As a result, the reforms of their economies may and 
often does end in a fiasco. Thus, Carew aptly points out the importance of the social costs of 
                                                                 
15 The well known Ghanian phi losopher Kwame Anthony Appiah describes this phenomenon in the following 
way: ‘under the coordinated instrumentalities of the IMF and the World Bank, programs of so -called structura l  
adjustment have forced elites to accept reduced involvement in the economy as the price of the financial (and 
technical) resources of international capital. The price of shoring up the state is a frank acknowledgement of its  
l imits: a reining in of the symbolic, material, and coercive resources of the state’; cf .: K.A. Appiah, In My 
Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 167. 
16 Cf.: K. Trzciński, ‘Afrykański głos w dyskusji  o wpływie globalizacji  na rozbudzenie tożsamości pierwotnych ’ 
(‘The African Voice in the Discussion on the Influence of Globalisation on the Awakening of Primeval 
Identities ’), in E. Rekłajtis, R. Wiśniewski, J. Zdanowski (eds), Jedność i różnorodność. Kultura vs. kultury (Unity 
and Diversity. Culture vs. Cultures), Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2010, p. 217. 
17In this context, the critics of structural adjustment programmes have even coined the irreverent name ‘Infant 
Mortality Fund’ for the International Monetary Fund. See: P. Beinart, ‘Globalization and Africa ’, in K.A. Appiah, 
H.L. Gates Jr. (eds.), Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience, vol. 3, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 7. 
18 James Ferguson, a North American anthropologist of culture and professor at the Stanford University,  
presents this problem on the example of Lesotho in the works: The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development”, 
Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990; and 
Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal Order, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
reforms in the poor countries. Their inhabitants, faced e.g. with the loss of a share of sources  
of income or drastic increase of food prices , could stop supporting the democratic 
transformation, especially if they are introduced alongside arduous economic reforms and 
tend to be identified with them. 
It should be noted that the Sierra Leonean philosopher does not oppose democratic 
reforms per se. On the contrary, he does not want them to be accompanied by an arduous 
economic transformation, conducted according to principles devised somewhere outside 
Africa and without the participation of Africans. However, it is impossible to decide whether 
Carew would prefer the African state to first finish political transformations and then 
introduce economic reforms, or whether he would agree to the simultaneous 
implementation of these transformations if the transformation in the economy was slower 
and less rigorous. 
Carew criticises the fact that international financial organisations force the 
governments of poor states to introduce reforms which the rich states would never dare to 
impose on their own societies. However, we should not forget that the rich countries do not 
need to do that, as they are in a stage of development in which there is no need to introduce 
vast economic transformations. Thus, this argument seems rather inapt. 
Pointing out the high social costs of the difficult economic reforms in the African 
countries, Carew almost ignores the fact that they are, to a large extent, generated by 
various internal factors, particularly related to politics . While the philosopher does not claim 
that the governments of African countries never make mistakes, he also refrains from 
criticising their dishonesty, although the degree of corruption and embezzlement of public 
funds in African countries is among the highest in the world. The people holding power in 
Africa often do not have sufficient qualifications to govern a country professionally and the 
political elites of many states are not at all interested in the development of the democratic 
system,19 which usually ensures better control over public funds and more effective actions 
against self-interest than autocracy. Carew, however, fails to mention that.20 Consequently, 
one might get the impression that external entities are responsible for the majority of the 
problems of the African state, while this is most certainly not true. 
Furthermore, the philosopher claims that implementing adjustment programmes in 
various African countries has led to destabilisation of their internal political situation, which 
often ended in coups d’état and seizing power by the military. This, however, is a far-
reaching generalisation. Coups d’état have not appeared in Africa upon the attempts to 
introduce deep economic transformation, but were almost the typical manner of replacing 
the ruling elite in many countries in the postcolonial times. They had diverse reasons and 
                                                                 
19 This view was popularised by, for instance, the eminent Nigerian political philosopher C laude Ake in the work  
The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar: Codesria, 2000, pp. 160, 190. 
20 The Sierra Leonean philosopher can avoid this criticism for example because he used to work in the 
diplomatic corps of Sierra Leone, representing its autocratic government. 
were executed by various factions opposing the governments. It would also be difficult to 
prove that the implemented reforms have actually increased the number of putsches taking 
place. As the history of the late 20th and early 21st century shows, coups d’état are now 
rather rarer than they used to be.21 Nowadays, the West requires African politicians to get to 
power in a more peaceful way, which is not to say that they do this fully in accordance with 
the standards of established democracies. For instance, they often prolong the period of 
remaining in power using electoral fraud. Hence, the manner of getting to power in Africa 
has evolved through external pressure and although it is still not democratic, it takes a 
bloody turn much less frequently than it used to. 
Looking for external culprits of the failure of the economic and political 
transformation in Africa, Carew treats the actors in the international arena selectively. He 
focuses only on two entities remaining in a direct relation to each other – international 
financial organisations and the rich countries which in fact control the former. The Sierra 
Leonean philosopher completely ignores supranational concerns, which have a considerable 
influence on global politics and which perhaps deserve criticism more than any other foreign 
entities affecting the situation in Africa.22 They are often accused of corrupting officials – 
especially the members of autocratic governments – and thus delaying the processes of 
democratisation in Africa. It also seems doubtful that development and consolidating  
democracy in countries in which the concerns employ cheap workforce, exploi t natural 
resources, maintain plantations, or produce and sell various products and services are as 
important for them as their own benefit. It could also be that they influence the 
governments of rich countries, which, in turn, spur international financia l organisations to 
devise and introduce such economic reforms in the African countries which will, above all,  
allow them to accumulate large profits. 
Carew also fails to take notice of the problem of illegal activity of both African and 
non-African entities of various type, which benefit from, for instance, mining raw materials 
in Africa, selling weapons or falling forests. Actions such as these deprive the budgets of 
African countries of a share of due income and often lead to long-lasting and devastating 
internal and regional conflicts.23 
Carew’s disapproval of the simultaneous introduction of political and economic 
transformation in the African state would be much more convincing if, instead of arguing 
that the economic reforms imposed by non-African experts are directly weakening the 
                                                                 
21 Nevertheless, coups d’état sti l l  take place in Africa, as proved by the examples of, for instance, Mauretania 
(2003 and 2005), Guinea-Bissau (2003), Central African Republic (2003). For more on this problem see e.g.: A.-
C. Robert, ‘Afryka, demokracja i  my’, Le Monde Diplomatique, Polish Edition, no. 3, 2010, pp. 14–15. 
22 This problem has been voiced by C. Ake, ‘How Politics Underdevelops Africa ’, in A. Adedeji, O. Teriba, P. 
Bugembe (eds), The Challenge of African Economic Recovery and Development, London: Frank Cass, 1991, p. 
322. 
23 On the example of selected countries of West Africa see: K. Trzciński, Wojny w Liberii i Sierra Leone (1989–
2002). Geneza, przebieg i następstwa (Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 1989–2002. Genesis, Course and 
Consequences), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie ‘Dialog’, 2002. 
development of democracy, he explicitly acknowledged the incorrectness of the assumption 
that in Africa democratic transformations should be accompanied – in accordance with the 
policies of most countries and financial organisations providing assistance to Africa – by a 
deep economic liberalisation taking place in a very short time. It seems that the fundamental 
problem does not consist in the claim that a free-market reform of the economy is required 
in order to build a lasting democracy, but rather in the very fast pace of implementation. 
Carew could be right in pointing out that the conditions of implementation of the economic 
transformations devised by international financial organisations are too rigorous for the 
African societies. 
 
The need to transform the global economy and politics 
Carew represents the opinion that the best help for the development of democracy 
in the African state would be a comprehensive transformation of the current rules governing 
the world order. In the philosopher’s view, this order is based on – which is worth stressing 
once again – a system of domination of the rich countries and the international financial 
institutions they control over the poor countries, forced to introduce reforms the content 
and conditions of which hamper the development of democracy. 
Carew believes that every international redistribution project devised and 
implemented in accordance with the rules governing economic globalism weakens the 
sovereignty of the poor countries, while the construction underlying the activity of various 
international organisations, including the UN and its agencies, essentially deprives the said 
countries of any influence on the decisions made in the international arena.24 Especially the 
current system of the UN is supposed to combine two contrary principles : equality of 
sovereign states and the special status of a few states which are permanent members of the 
Security Council. Carew writes that ‘the implication is that the interests of superpowers must 
never be sacrificed for democracy in the event of a clash’.25 Consequently, in the present 
state of affairs equality seems but a myth. 
The Sierra Leonean philosopher calls for the introduction of, as he puts it, global 
intervention,26 i.e. an involvement of the international community in the internal affairs of 
its members when it is necessary, coordinated and devoid of the hegemony of rich states . 
Carew considers global intervention a more just form of international relations, including the 
process of making decisions concerning its members. Global intervention would be 
particularly important in the economic relations in the world. The rules of global 
intervention would be devoid of hierarchisation; rich states would not force on the poor 
ones economic solutions which do not take into account the poor countries’ complex 
                                                                 
24 G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach , pp. 130–131. 
25 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the State in Africa ’, p. 467. 
26 Ibidem, p. 466. 
internal cultural and social particularities . Moreover, Carew is convinced that sooner or later, 
‘dependent states face the grim prospect of extinction without some such global 
intervention’.27 
However, global intervention should not be limited to economic issues and concern 
only the donors of aid. Consequently, for instance, the citizens of African countries who fall 
victim to illegal actions of their governments should have the opportunity to receive 
assistance from supranational judiciary institutions. In the philosopher’s opinion, this kind of  
limitation of the independence of the African state is desirable, if only for the sole sake of 
being able to hold the governing elites internationally accountable for their actions, e.g. 
violations of human rights. Hence, what Carew calls for, essentially comes down to 
broadening the scope of activity of the international judiciary system, in particular – we 
might safely assume – the International Criminal Court, in such a way as to allow even single 
individuals to lodge a complaint with the ICC about the actions of state authorities . 
Carew is aware of the fact that global intervention will s till to some extent limit the 
sovereignty of poor countries. In his opinion, the two values do not necessarily have to be 
contradictory. On the contrary, they can be complementary to one another in the event of 
executing the concept of deliberative democracy on a global scale.28 Furthermore, Carew 
believes that restructuring the world order on the basis of deliberative democracy would be 
conducive to its introduction in the African state as well. 
In the philosophers opinion, the three fundamental and closely interrelated 
principles, or rather ideals of deliberative democracy are: rational deliberation, participatory 
politics and civic governance.29 The first of these, the ideal of rational deliberation, includes 
the premise of conducting a debate based on well thought out rules which are not 
detrimental to any of the parties. The second ideal, participatory politics, assumes a full, 
actual participation of the representatives of various parties (or interests)  in politics, based 
on identical principles. The philosopher emphasises that they all must have the opportunity 
to comprehensively present their positions in political and economic debates. The third 
ideal, civic governance, is participatory decision-making which takes into account various 
interests30 and results in decisions which are based on the principles of freedom and 
equality.31 In accordance with this ideal, the parties to the process of decision-making need 
                                                                 
27 Ibidem. 
28 Among the new papers dealing generally with the principles and practice of deliberative democracy see: R.E. 
Goodin, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn , Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008 and J. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation , 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
29 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the State in Africa ’, p. 462. 
30 Cf.: F. Fischer, Participatory Governance as Deliberative Empowerment: The Cultural Politics of Discursive 
Space, in: M. Bevir (ed.), Interpretive Political Science, t. IV: Interpreting Politics, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 
349–350. 
31 Earlier Carew wrote on this issue in the context of actual equality of Afro-Americans in the United States. 
See: G.M. Carew, Liberalism and the Politics of Emancipation: The Black Experience’, in L.R. Gordon (ed.), 
Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy , London: Routledge, 1997, p. 239. 
to understand the necessity of acting for the common good and must strive after a 
compromise.32 If fulfilled, these ideals are to edify the relations between the entities active 
in the international arena and in the future also the political reality in the African state. 
In the philosopher’s view, the fulfilment of the ideals of deliberative democracy in 
the supranational dimension would also eliminate the defencelessness of the poor countries 
in global politics.33 First of all, it would allow democratic control over the world economy. 
Carew is convinced that in a deliberative reality, the governments of African countries would 
finally have real influence on the decisions being made in the international arena and 
concerning their societies. As a result, they would no longer be forced to policies  which 
cause further impoverishment once implemented. What is more, the Sierra Leonean 
philosopher believes that the changes introduced into the international order by deliberative 
democracy ‘will require not only redistribution of resources but also reparations to correct 
the injustices of a previous world order. This might take many forms, including, for example, 
debt cancellation, and other forms of assistance aimed primarily not at poverty alleviation, 
as they now are, but its eradication’.34 
In consequence of establishing a global order based on the ideals of deliberative 
democracy, it would be the state authorities and not the international financial institutions 
controlled by rich countries who would be playing the principal role in solving the internal 
problems of African societies. However, in order to fulfil this goal, it is necessary to have the 
ideals of deliberative democracy implemented not only in the international dimension, but 
also on the state level. Moreover, Carew is convinced that implementing the concept of 
deliberative democracy in the African state would constitute a ‘useful corrective to pure 
democratic proceduralism, which is incapable of guaranteeing a democratic outcome that 
might be described as just’.35 
Inspired by the views of John S. Dryzek,36 Carew notes that the present, unfair world 
order can be changed by transforming the principles of functioning of the civil society and its 
activation and dedication to propagating democracy. Carew particularly stresses the fact 
that according to Dryzek, many non-governmental organisations, operating both within 
                                                                 
32 Cf.: J. Węgrzecki, ‘Przyszłość demokracji  deliberatywnej ’, pp. 30–39. 
33 Cf.: A. Gutmann, D.F. Thompsona, Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 
pp. 32–37. 
34 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Sta te in Africa’, p. 467. 
35 Ibidem, pp. 463, 470. 
36 John S. Dryzek – an Australian political philosopher, professor of social and political theory at the Austra l i a n 
National University (ANU) in Canberra, before that a professor of political science at the Uni versity of Oregon 
and University of Melbourne; presently he focuses mainly on the theory and practice of deliberative 
democracy, global governance and ecologism; the author of e.g. Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Struggles, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996; co-author of (with Patrick Dunleavy) Theories of the Democratic State, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
states and in the international arena,37 have similar goals which can be generally summed up 
as providing assistance to those in need and serving the common good.38 This similarity of 
goals could be used to deepen the mutual cooperation of non-governmental organisations, 
especially in order to stop the global rush of capitalism, based on hegemonic and often 
egoist foundation.39 
It seems important that Dryzek’s views lead Carew to the conclusion that various civil 
society movements and organisations should start functioning in accordance with the ideals 
of deliberation and, consequently, practice democracy more broadly in their own ranks. This 
way, he writes, people will receive first-hand knowledge on what it is like to belong to a free 
association with a democratic character and they will learn the values of freedom, 
transparency and accountability not in theory, but as a living experience.40 
The Sierra Leonean philosopher would have democratisation of the civil society in the 
worldwide dimension become the model for the transformation of the international and 
intranational order and, especially, assist in the introduction of the ideals of deliberative 
democracy. In this context, Carew quotes the thoughts of Seyla Benhabib,41 among others. 
He points out that both the views of Benhabib and the entire idea of deliberative democracy 
are sometimes criticised for their supposed lack of an institutional dimension. However, he 
believes – as does Benhabib – that the implementation of the principles of deliberative 
democracy could take advantage of the already existing institutions of liberal democracy,42 
as the problem is not the need to construct some new institutions, but rather the need to 
change the style of conducting politics. Furthermore, Carew believes that with the 
functioning of a democratic deliberative community on both the international and state 
levels, conflicts of interests would be solved in an atmosphere of growing trust and 
cooperation instead of the present rivalry.43 He points out that referring to the deliberative 
form of politics ‘would presuppose that transformation in a way has occurred in such 
                                                                 
37 See: G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach, p. 135, where the 
author mentioned the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Oxfam as examples of non-
governmental organisations which perform their international tasks well . 
38 John S. Dryzek cites an interesting example of the Ogoni people, inhabiting the delta of the Niger River, who 
sought help with internationally active Western non-governmental organisations in solving the ecological 
conflict with the oil  company Shell . See: J.S. Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies. Alternatives 
to Agonism and Analgesia ’, Political Theory, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, p. 232. For more on the problem discussed 
here see the Amnesty International report: Petroleum, Poverty and Pollution in the Niger Delta , source: 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_19492.pdf 
39 Cf.: J.S. Dryzek, Democracy in Divided Societies, pp. 71–91. 
40 G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach , p. 135. 
41 Seyla Benhabib – a philosopher dealing with, among others, cosmopolitism, feminism, citizenship, 
deliberative democracy, the global civil  society; professor of political science and philosophy at the Yale 
University; author of e.g. Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Democratic Iterations , 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004; The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era , Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
42 For more see: G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa, pp. 92–94, where the author also 
elaborates on the main principles of deliberative democracy. 
43 Ibidem, p. 95. 
attitudes as are envisaged by, say, liberal egoists, who hold that politics is only about self-
interest and the market’.44 
Carew is also interested in the reflections of David Held,45 who calls for the 
establishment of a new, democratised and cosmopolitan world order.46 The first stage of this 
process would consist in ceding the power of the present major global decision-making 
centres to regional and continental assemblies, which would influence matters in their 
respective parts of the world. Next, Held calls for a thorough reform of the United Nations 
system, redefining the role of international financial institutions and establishing the World 
Court.47 Carew is very enthusiastic about the ideas propagated by Held. However, the Sierra 
Leonean philosopher believes that they can really be implemented only if deliberative 
culture is promoted by the civil society in the global dimension. 
 
Polemics with Carew’s theses – Part 2 
Carew’s belief in facilitating democratisation of the African state through the 
transformation of the principles governing world politics and economy requires an additional 
commentary. It seems important that the philosopher promotes a vision of development of 
an international deliberative community which would devise various policies respecting the 
interests of the poor states. In such an improved global situation, the representatives of all 
countries would have the opportunity to conduct a dialogue and actually participate in the 
decision-making process. Although presently representatives of poor states are admitted to 
debates in various global forums, they do not really have any significant influence on the 
decisions being made there. Carew is probably quite right in saying that requiring the African 
countries to automatically yield to various decisions of the community of rich states can 
have a detrimental effect on their internal political and economic problems. 
However, it is not really certain whether it is justified of Carew to look for a means to 
overcome the weakness of the African state in strengthening the share of its government in 
the global processes of decision-making. It is not known whether having a stronger position 
in the international arena, the governments of African states would be able to successfully 
                                                                 
44 G.M. Carew, ‘Economic Globalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the State in Afr ica’, p. 463. 
45 David Held – a British political theoretician, professor of political science at the London School of Economi c s  
and Political Science; he deals with, among others, globalisation, cosmopolitism, global governance, 
democratisation; author of e.g. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010; Models of 
Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006; co-author of (with Anthony McGrewe) Globalization/Anti-
Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007; (wi th Garrett Brown) The 
Cosmopolitanism Reader, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. 
46 See: D. Held, ‘Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order ’, Political Studies, vol. 40, Supplement 1, 
1992, pp. 10–39; idem, ‘Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global  System’, Economy and Society, vol. 20, no. 
2, 1991, pp. 138–172; Cf.: G.M. Carew, Democratic Transition in Postcolonial Africa: A Deliberative Approach , p. 
134. 
47 See: D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governan ce, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
convince the rich countries to finance better programmes aimed at the transformation of 
their states’ economy. Who would devise such optimal solutions? Would it be some native 
experts collaborating with the government of the African state? Carew neither asks such 
questions nor answers them in any way. 
He believes, however, that the hierarchisation existing in the international order is 
bad, as in consequence the opinions of those who are subjected to arduous economic 
transformations are disregarded. But is there any guarantee that having a greater share in 
the decision-making processes in the international arena, the representatives of the poor 
countries would have deeper expert knowledge on how the economic transformation of 
their countries should look like? Should we assume a priori that all ideas presented by the 
African governments will be apt? Carew’s arguments would be more convincing if he pointed 
out the African partners who would be able to assist the experts from international 
organisations in devising programmes of economic transformation better suiting the 
complex reality of the African state. This role could be played by some independent African 
professionals. Perhaps with their help foreign experts would gain deeper understanding of 
the local specificity, would be more open to the need to support the types of activity in 
which Africans have been involved so far and to taking advantage of their experience, skills 
and customs in devising and executing economic reforms.48 
It is also incorrect that Carew envisions only a limited role of the international civil 
society in the possible transformation of the hierarchised global economic and political order 
which he criticises. After all, there are nowadays many non-governmental organisations 
active in the international arena which often – even if only through trainings or subsidies – 
support local initiatives in the poor countries.49 The recipients of their assistance often have 
great confidence in these organisations. And even though it seems that the idea of fair trade, 
promoted by some non-governmental organisations, is gradually becoming more and more 
important in the world, it is still the rich countries and various international institutions who 
remain the major actors in the international arena and who make the key decisions 
concerning assistance provided to the poor countries – which is often done without the 
participation of civil society organisations. Meanwhile, taking into account the experience 
they have accumulated, non-governmental organisations could probably play a much more 
significant role in the global debate on economic issues and could be helping, to a much 
greater extent, in devising and implementing the programmes aimed at furthering the 
development of African societies. Perhaps the proposals of the Sierra Leonean philosopher 
should be aimed at this goal. 
                                                                 
48 In this context, it is of symbolical meaning that the Kenyan activist Wangari Maathai received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2004 for, among others, the promotion of sustainable social development. Maathai remains a 
symbol of the development of the civil  society in Africa, the fight for environmental protection, for the change 
of the existing social  status quo – especially regarding the rights of women, and of the fight for democracy and 
good governance. 
49 Probably the best example is the international organisation Doctors Without Borders , which not only 
provides aid in many African countries, but also trains local specialists . 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Carew’s proposals concerning the healing of the 
contemporary political and economic world order are very general. While the philosopher 
stresses that the key to restructuring the global status quo is the introduction of deliberative 
democracy in the international arena, he fails to specify what exactly the implementation of 
its ideals in the international arena should look like and whether the existing mechanisms of 
decision-making should be reformed through evolution or resolutely replaced with some 
entirely new solutions. 
Carew joins the numerous critics of the United Nations system in its present shape,50 
but his reflections do not deal with such issues as whether – and if yes, then how – the 
composition of the Security Council should be reformed or the institution of veto should be 
introduced.51 In this context, the question comes to mind whether it is at all possible with 
some countries in the world having but a dozen or a couple dozen thousand inhabitants , 
while other have more than a billion citizens, to abolish unequal treatment of some of the 
world’s entities. Of course, one could argue which states, especially among those with a 
large population, should have permanent seats in the Security Council, but it is hard to 
decide without doubt whether the norms under which the UN functions are undemocratic, 
or whether they would be undemocratic if, for instance, they included rules giving equal 
voting rights to all countries regardless of the size of their populations . 
Similar doubts concern the issue of the proposed transformations of the principles 
under which international financial organisations provide economic assistance, its content 
and method of provision. How would these changes be carried out, even with the 
introduction of the principles of deliberative democracy, given the existing division into 
donors and beneficiaries? Surely we can agree with the view that many economic 
programmes devised by the experts from, for example, the World Bank or the IMF and 
either executed or co-executed by them have failed, but, at the same time, it is rather hard 
to believe that the members of the African state’s authorities – often corrupt and 
incompetent – have the knowledge on how to best and most effectively help their state. Of 
course, we can assume that the introduction of the ideals of deliberative democracy 
presented by Carew in the African state would lower dishonesty and ignorance of the ruling 
elites, but we cannot be sure that this will actually happen, especially in a relatively short 
timespan. 
 
Conclusions 
Carew’s reflections prove that the issues important to contemporary international 
relations are present in the African intellectual thought. They seem all the more valuable, as 
                                                                 
50 See: D. Archibugi, ‘The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Critical Review’, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 30, no. 3, 1993, pp. 301–315. 
51 See: ibidem, pp. 301–302, 307–309. 
they surely reflect the views of many intellectuals from the African countries which do not 
play any significant role in the international arena. 
Furthermore, Carew’s reflection constitutes evidence of the modern discourse on the 
need for a transformation of many elements of the world order – despite the fact that it  
concentrates to a considerable extent on attempts to change the present state of affairs in 
which rich states, especially the United States, wield hegemonic power and make decisions 
concerning a significant part of the world – being largely based on the ideas and proposals 
devised and propagated by Western thinkers and theoreticians of international relations and 
politics per se. Nevertheless, even though Carew is inspired by patterns originating with 
Western science and intellectual culture, he also attempts to compile their conceptual 
achievements, especially those concerning the implementation of the ideals of deliberative 
democracy and the transformation of the role of the international civil society, as well as his 
own views, that is proposals concerning a global intervention and broadening the 
competences of international judiciary institutions. It seems that he also tries to use this to 
better show to Africans and non-Africans the problems and challenges faced by modern 
African countries and to accentuate their importance for the future of democratisation in 
Africa and in the world. 
Although Carew does not present any specific means of carrying out the 
democratisation of the world order which he advocates, we should also remember that 
political thinkers rarely suggest any detailed solutions for the issues they discuss or any 
methods for introducing the visions they present. They usually leave this task to sociologists, 
political scientists, economists, and lawyers. The role of philosophers, in turn, seems to 
consist in outlining some general projects, providing deeper reflection and pointing to new 
horizons of thought. Philosophers usually perceive reality in a much more abstract way than 
other intellectuals; they seem to have a broader knowledge of the human nature and the 
motives for man’s actions, as well as the ability to compare diverse experiences with great 
insight and draw original and unique conclusions from these comparisons. In this sense, 
every thorough political vision can be of use to the science of international relations , 
including the one presented by Carew, especially since he has both theoretical and practical 
experience with the problems he writes about – as a philosopher, an academic, a former 
diplomat and a working missionary. 
 
